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The recent withdrawal of the Cryptomarkt may have overwhelmed, but it also did something useful – it forced the Defi community to talk about an important topic that we usually ignore in a bullmarkt hype: risk management.
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In March 2025, Hyperliquid – one of the most respected Defi platforms – was startled by two market manipulation events. One was a huge long position on Ethereum (ETH), the other a short game focused on a memecoin with small caps called Jelly. These transactions were not only smart exploits; They were alarm bells that rang over the fundamental weaknesses in Defi’s risk infrastructure.
Two sides of the same problem
The first attack concerned a trader who used $ 307 million in ETH at 50x and then strategically withdraw the collateral as the price rose to bring the position close to the liquidation. When the price fell, the forced liquidation could not be absorbed by Hyperliquuid’s Liquuidity Pool (HLP) without large slips, which cost the HLP $ 4 million, while the trader yielded almost half of that profit. The most important remedies by Hyperliquid included the lowering of leverage limits for Bitcoin (BTC) and ETH, increasing the maintenance margin requirements and limiting collateral confidence to at least 20% of the open positions.
Weeks later the Jelly incident happened. A trader operated the low liquidity of the memecoin on Dex’s and bought them aggressively while held a short position on Hyperliquid, which caused a price increase that pushed HLP into a non-realized loss of almost $ 13 million. In response to this, the Hyperliquid validators arrived and voted controversial voices to settle with violence at a considerably lower price and switch-yellow perpetuals. The protocol arose the loss, but at the expense of its own decentralization story and associated risks.
Both events and short, blue-chip and ‘shitcoin’ point to the same root problem: Defi still largely treats risk management as a side issue.
Tradefi has been there before
That said, this is nothing new. Traditional financing has seen it all before through derivatives, margin spirals and rogue transactions. But after each crisis it didn’t recover alone; It was hardened. Position limits, capital requirements, stress tests and other advanced methods were not standard because they were nice, but because they were needed.
In many cases, Defi, on the other hand, continues to reward high leverage, underestimates the liquidity risk and leaves management decorations to Validatorstemts that can be induced reactively and by panic. Nevertheless, we don’t have to become Tradefi, but we have to take over the discipline behind its evolution.
Risk is not the enemy – it is
The hyperliquid incidents have taught us some important lessons about better compliance with the risk management protocols. For example:
- Position caps and margin locks can have limited exposure, neutralized ETH for a long time and prevent forced liquidations.
- Better standards for offering assets would have prevented Jelly from becoming a systemic liability.
- Clear, enforceable deletion protocols would have avoided governance panic that undermined confidence.
These are not burdens but basic building blocks, and they must be embedded during protocol design, not made retroactively.
The truth is that most Defi platforms still catch on risks, often learn by painful trial and error. Yet we cannot afford to continue to stumble from one exploit to another, in the hope that users will forgive and forget.
Risk in Defi is interconnected – and strengthened
Defi is not just one ecosystem; It is a interconnected jumble of protocols, tokens and cross-chain bridges, which strengthens infection risks. A failure in one area – whether it is smart, risk, liquidity runches or missteps for governance – can quickly go throughout the pile.
When a liquidity pool collapses, users spread. When a governance mood looks random or random, the institutional adoption hesitates. When a stablecoin devotes, everyone holds their breath.
This is not only technical risk – the market risk, reputation risk and increasingly regulatory risk.
Paranoia is not overreaction, it is maturity
Some players in the crypto circles see risk management remain as a brake on innovation, and that is a mistake. The next generation of Defi leaders will not be the ones who chase the highest APYs. They will be those who build resilient protocols that can withstand volatility, manipulations and regulatory tests.
Paranoia in Defi is not a weakness; It is a sign of adulthood.
If we want Defi to become a serious alternative to Tradfi, we must start considering risks in every draft decision we make, and not just during post-mortems. Because when the next exploit comes – and it will certainly do it – the only question will be whether we were prepared or just hoping for the best.
Read more: Five ways to tackle security risks in crypto transactions | Opinion
Hong Yes
Hong Yes is the co-founder and CEO at GRVT. Hong has been a trader at Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs for ten years, respectively, prior to the establishment of GRVT in May 2022, weeks before the crypto-market crash. The GRVT team strives to bring about a revolution in the financial markets by integrating blockchain technology and self-assured solutions into both Trandfi and Defi. By applying blockchain settlement and confidential risk management to centralized order book infrastructure, transforms GRVT Trade and Investments and entails traditional safety controls. Hong believes that this approach, starting with crypto markets, can reform the entire financial landscape. With an international education in Malaysia and Poland, followed by studying business management at Yonsei University in Korea, Hong uses his various international background and strategic insight to control the mission of GRVT.